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Abstract
This paper proposes a theory on how studentssocial background a¤ects
their school attainment and job opportunities. We study a setup where stu-
dents di¤er in ability and social background, and we analyse the interaction
between a school and an employer. Students with disadvantaged background
are penalised compared to other students: they receive less teaching and/or
are less likely to be hired. A surprising result is that policy aiming to sub-
sidise education for disadvantaged students might in fact decrease their job
opportunities.
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1 Introduction
There is substantial evidence that individualssocial background inuences
their educational results and job opportunities1. This paper proposes a theo-
retical explanation for this by examining how school and employer behaviour
changes according to the studentssocial background.
We consider a signalling game between a school and an employer where
the students they deal with di¤er in ability and social background. The
school prepares students for a nal exam and wants the largest number of
them to be hired. We assume that teaching improves the studentschance of
obtaining a good grade but not their ability. On the other side, the employer
wants to hire only high-ability students and observes the exam grade as a
signal of ability.
We assume that students with advantaged social backgrounds are more
likely to have higher ability. This assumption is crucial for our results and
is supported by past research documenting that family and environmental
factors are major predictors of cognitive skills (Cunha et al., 2006, Carneiro
and Heckman, 2003, Joshi and McCulloc, 2000). The idea is that given the
same distribution of innate ability within populations with di¤ering social
backgrounds, an advantaged environment can help develop skills via parental
and peer pressure.
Our results suggest that students from a disadvantaged social background
receive less teaching and/or are hired with less chance. The intuition is the
following. The employer prefers advantaged rather than disadvantaged and
high-grade students as they are more likely to have high ability. To increase
the hiring opportunities of disadvantaged students, the school may devote less
1For some empirical evidence on the relationship between social background and edu-
cational attainment, see Haveman and Wolfe (1995) for a discussion, while Galindo-Rueda
and Vignoles (2005) and Marcenaro-Gutierrez et al. (2007) give some recent contribu-
tions. For job opportunities, Glyn and Salverda (2000) and Berthoud and Blekesaune
(2006) show how social background a¤ects the chance of nding a job in OECD countries
and UK, respectively.
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teaching e¤ort to disadvantaged and low-ability students, because this gives
them less chance of obtaining a high grade, and thus the expected ability of
disadvantaged and high-grade students increases. Despite that, the employer
may still nd it preferable to hire advantaged students. Thus disadvantaged
students are penalised in school attainment and/or in job opportunities, and
this clearly aggravates class di¤erences.
Furthermore, these results are related to the phenomenon known as grade
ination, which takes place when good grades are awarded too easily. An
interesting result is that the presence of grade ination might help disadvan-
taged students to have the same job opportunities as advantaged students.
The reason is that grade ination diminishes the employers expectations
about studentsability. Since the school here devotes less teaching e¤ort to
disadvantaged rather than advantaged and low-ability students, the e¤ect
of grade ination is relatively stronger for advantaged students. This leads
high-grade students to have the same job opportunities irrespective of their
social backgrounds.
We then consider a government that subsidises the cost of teaching dis-
advantaged students. Such policy may diminish their chance of being hired.
The reason is that more low-ability and disadvantaged students obtain a high
grade, therefore the employers expectations about the ability high-grade and
disadvantaged students decrease.
The paper can be related to the literature on signalling models (Spence,
1973; for a survey of the literature, see Riley, 2001). In particular, the model
presents a structure which is similar to Waldmann (1984), where a game
between an employer and the job market takes place and the employees are
no players. In analogy, in our model a school and an employer interact
and the students are no players.
The paper is also related to the literature on grade ination. Chan et al.
(2007) propose a signalling model where employers know only the students
grade but not the studentsability and the state of the world (that is, the
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proportion of talented students). This gives rise to an incentive to help some
low ability students by giving them good grades. Indeed the labour market
cannot fully distinguish whether this is due to a high grading standard or
whether the school has a large proportion of talented students, and this in
turn hampers the signal of good students. In Chan et al. di¤erences in social
background are not considered, which instead are central in our analysis.
Also, we assume that the employer knows the proportion of talented students.
Schwager (2008) examines the impact of grade ination on the job market
with students that di¤er in ability and social background. They are matched
with rms which o¤er di¤erent kinds of job, according to the grade and the
expected ability. Regardless of the social background, it is possible that
mediocre students receive a high grade caused by grade ination. Also, the
high-ability students from advantaged backgrounds may benet from grade
ination since this shields them from the competition on the part of able
and disadvantaged students. Compared to this analysis, we share the same
assumptions on the distributions of ability with di¤ering social backgrounds,
but in our model disadvantaged students may benet from the presence of
ination grade.
Finally, our paper is related to De Fraja (2005) who studies the provi-
sion of education when students di¤er in ability and social background. In
the presence of asymmetric information (the government does not know the
students ability) and externalities (the public provision of education makes
students acquire more education than they would acquire privately) the op-
timal provision of education is a second best result where high-ability and
disadvantaged students receive more education than high-ability and advan-
taged students. Hence the introduction of reverse discrimination policies,
like a¢ rmative action2, are justied on e¢ ciency grounds, and the trade-o¤
2The term a¢ rmative actionrefers to policies that attempt to increase the presence
of individuals who belong to minorities in areas of employment and education. These
policies generate controversy when they involve preferential selection on the basis of race,
gender or ethnicity.
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between equity and e¢ ciency disappears. According to our results, a policy
intervention is necessary in order to obtain the optimal provision of educa-
tion in the presence of di¤erences in social background, since a school caring
about the employment of its students does not devote more teaching e¤ort
to disadvantaged rather than advantaged and high-ability students.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The model is pre-
sented in Section 1.2. Section 1.3 examines the equilibria. Section 1.4 con-
siders the government intervention. Section 1.5 concludes.
2 The model
We study the interaction between a single school and a single employer.3 The
interaction takes place since a number of students, with measure normalised
to one, attends school and afterwards asks the employer for a job.
Students can have high (H) or low (L) ability. In addition to ability, stu-
dents can come from advantaged (a) or disadvantaged (d) social backgrounds,
which is public information: this can be interpreted as a one-dimensional
measure of family environment, peer groups4 and neighbourhood. We de-
note as  2 [0; 1] the proportion of advantaged students. Let pa; pd 2 [0; 1]
be the probability that an advantaged or disadvantaged student has high-
ability, respectively. As we stressed in the introduction, we assume pa > pd.
3For simplicity, we abstract from factors such as competition between schools and
between employers.
4Peer groups means that students learn better if they are in a group of abler students.
See Moreland and Levine (1992) for a psychology viewpoint, Summers and Wolfe (1977),
Henderson et al. (1978), Epple et al. ( 2003) and Zimmer and Toma (2000) for economic
empirical studies. From a theoretical point of view, see Arnott and Rowse (1987), de
Bartolome (1990) and Epple and Romano (1998) that consider explicitly the peer group
e¤ect.
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2.1 Employer
The employer decides whether or not to hire a student and o¤ers a single job
type.
We dene job capacity as the maximum number of students that may be
hired and we denoted it as  2 [0; 1]. For the sake of simplicity, we assume
that  is exogenous and depends on the employers production potential,
that is the size and technology of his rm. As a consequence, neither the
interaction between school and the employer nor the studentstype can a¤ect
the employers production potential.
Still for simplicity, we rule out uncertainty in the market where the em-
ployer operates and we assume that the studentsability determines the em-
ployers prot entirely. In particular, each high-ability student yields a prot
of  > 0 while each low-ability student yields a prot of  1. The choice of
 and  1 is to simplify the algebra: other normalisations would complicate
the analysis without changing the results. The assumption that a low-ability
student gives negative prot can be interpreted in many ways: low-ability
employees may have a marginal productivity which is lower than salary cost.
In addition, the employer may want to lay o¤ a low-ability employee but this
action still comes at a cost, e.g. industrial disputes, wasted training costs
and time, and so on. Thus the employers payo¤ is given by H(H) H(L),
where H(H) and H(L) are the number of hired students with high or low
ability, respectively.
The employer doesnt know the studentsability and observes the grade
that a student obtains in a nal exam5 as a signal of it. The possible exam
outcomes are a low (gD) or a high (gU) grade.
5The exams which we have in mind in the real world are the Scholastic Assessment
Test in United States and the National Curriculum Assessment in United Kingdom.
These exams are managed by the Educational Testing Service (Rourke and Ingram,
1991).
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2.2 School
The school inuences job opportunities by preparing students for the nal
exam6, and learns the studentsability through their tests and assessments
results.
The school obtains a benet  > 0 for every hired student. The reason
is that each students employment increases its reputation as an e¤ective in-
stitution for obtaining a job. Of course a school might pursue this objective
in di¤erent ways, for example, by having a preference for some of their stu-
dents: it may derive more benet from increases in the job opportunities of
their brightest pupils, or, vice versa, from increases in the job opportunities
of their weakest pupils. To depict the interaction with the employer in the
most general way we abstract from these di¤erences.
The preparation for the exam requires resources: the quantity of teaching,
the quality of buildings and classroom equipment and the teacherse¤ort. We
refer to all these aspects as teaching. In addition to teaching, the school
can provide some students with extra teaching, that is additional resources,
extra tuition, trips and more facilities. We assume that, with teaching only,
the students probability of obtaining a high grade is H 2 (0; 1) if she has
high ability and zero if she has low ability. With extra teaching, the students
probability of obtaining a high grade is 1 if she has high ability and L 2 (0; 1)
if she has low ability. The school bears a cost c > 0 for each student receiving
extra teaching.
Hence the schools payo¤ is given by (H(H) + H(L))   cET , where
ET is the number of students receiving extra teaching.
6Note that the school does not arrange the exam and hence it cannot manipulate the
studentsgrades.
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2.3 The game between the school and the employer
The interaction can be described as follows. Nature draws the student types.
Then, each student7 attends school and the school chooses whether to give
her extra teaching. At the end of school period, students take the nal exam.
Finally, each student applies for a job, and the employer decides whether to
hire her.
3 Equilibria
We study the perfect Bayesian equilibria of this game. The choice of this equi-
librium concept is motivated by the employers missing information about
studentsability.
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a combination of school and employer
strategies and beliefs where both agents maximise their payo¤. After observ-
ing a grade, the employer has a belief about the student type, conditional on
all the information he has: students grade, distribution of ability according
to the students social background and school strategy. Hence his belief must
be consistent with Bayesrule. For each grade, the employer must maximise
his expected prot, given his belief and the school strategy. In turn the
schools strategy must maximise its expected payo¤, given the employers
strategy8. Then, job capacity requires that the number of hired students is
at most .
We start by making the following assumptions.
Assumption 1  < (pa + L (1  pa)) + (1  ) (pd + L (1  pd))).
Assumption 2  > max

c
L
;
c
1  L
;
c
H
;
c
1  H

.
7For simplicity, we assumed away the inuence of students e¤ort.
8Note that the school has perfect information of the student types.
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Assumption 1 says that job capacity is lower than the highest possible
number of high-grade students. This assumption focuses the attention on the
equilibria where social background plays a role in the school and employers
decisions. When this assumption does not hold, the employer may hire all the
high-grade students irrespective of their social background. In other words,
the individualssocial background would not a¤ect their job opportunities.
As we stressed in the introduction, the empirical evidence tells us in reality
this is not the case, so we prefer to set this case aside.
Assumption 2 says that the school benet of having a hired student is
su¢ ciently higher than the cost of providing her with extra teaching. This
rules out the possibility that a student would not receive extra teaching be-
cause, according to the school technology, it is too costly. Here we want
to focus on the case where the schools response depends on the employer
strategy completely, and disregard the role of school technology9. After pre-
senting Assumption 1 and 2, we introduce the notations of the school and
employers actions:
 xLa; xHa; xLd; xHd 2 [0; 1] are the probabilities that the school gives
extra teaching to an advantaged and low or high-ability student and to
a disadvantaged and low or high-ability student, respectively;
 zUa; zDa; zUd; zDd 2 [0; 1] are the probabilities that the employer hires
an advantaged student with a high or low grade and a disadvantaged
student with a high or low grade, respectively.
We then dene the employer beliefs about the students ability. These are
denoted by  (z j gj; pi; xzi), where z 2 fH;Lg is the ability level, gj; j 2
fU;Dg is the grade, pi; i 2 fa; dg is the distribution of ability and xzi is the
school strategy.
9To relax this assumption would allow us to compare schools with di¤erent technology.
This investigation can be interesting and may be considered for future work.
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Denition 1 The employers beliefs about the students ability which are
consistent with the Bayesrule are
 (H j gj; pi; xHi) = pixHi
pixHi + LxLi (1  pi)
;
and
 (L j gj; pi; xLi) = LxLi (1  pi)
pixHi + LxLi (1  pi)
:
As we will show below in the proof of Proposition 2, if Assumption 1
and 2 hold the equilibrium will be one of three types, which we label high-
employment, middle-employment and low-employment equilibrium.
Denition 2 A high-employment equilibrium is an equilibrium in which the
school strategy is xHa = xHd = xLa = xLd = 1;while the employer strategy is
zUa = 1; zUd =
  (pa + L (1  pa))
(1  ) (pd + L (1  pd))
2 (0; 1) ; zDa = zDd = 0:
Denition 3 A middle-employment equilibrium is an equilibrium in which
the school strategy is xHa = xHd = xLa = 1; xLd = pd= (1  pd) L 2 (0; 1) ;
while the employer strategy is
zUa = 1; zUd = min

c
L
;
  (pa + L (1  pa))
(1  ) (pd (1 + ))

2 (0; 1) ; zDa = zDd = 0:
Denition 4 A low-employment equilibrium is an equilibrium in which the
school strategy is xHa = xHd = 1; xLa = pa= (1  pa) L 2 (0; 1) ; xLd =
pd= (1  pd) L 2 (0; 1) ; while the employer strategy is
zUa = zUd = min

c
L
;

(pa + (1  ) pd) (1 + )

2 (0; 1) ; zDa = zDd = 0:
In the high-employment equilibrium the employer hires  students (i.e.,
as many students as he can according to job capacity) while the school pro-
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vides every student with extra teaching. Here the employer obtains a positive
expected prot from high-grade students from both advantaged and disad-
vantaged backgrounds. Thus, his optimal strategy is to hire all of them, but
Assumption 1 prevents this possibility. Then the employer needs to choose
between these two types. He will hire all the advantaged students, since they
give a higher expected prot, and the disadvantaged students will be hired
only for the remaining job capacity.
In themiddle-employment equilibrium, the employer does not want to hire
all the disadvantaged and high-grade students10. In turn, the school provides
extra teaching to a lower number of disadvantaged and low-ability students.
This strategy increases the probability that a disadvantaged and high-grade
student has high ability and thus it increases her chance to be hired.
In the low-employment equilibrium, the employer does not hire all the
high-grade students from both advantaged and disadvantaged backgrounds,
but is indi¤erent between hiring one of these two types. Like in the previous
equilibrium, the school provides extra teaching to fewer disadvantaged than
advantaged and low-ability students.
Note that the employer never hires a low-grade student: indeed all the
high-ability students receive extra-teaching in each equilibrium, thus a low-
grade student has low ability with probability one.
3.1 General case: di¤erences in social background
In this section, we consider  2 (0; 1). The following proposition shows which
equilibrium occurs depending on the values of pd and pa.
Proposition 1 Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. The high-employment equi-
librium occurs if pa  pd  L= ( + L); the middle-employment equilibrium
occurs if pa  L= ( + L) > pd; the low-employment equilibrium occurs if
pd < pa < L= ( + L).
10Given this strategy, the total of hired students might be higher or lower than job
capacity, and in the former case clearly this is  again.
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Proof. See Appendix.
Figure 1. Di¤erences in social background
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Figure 1 illustrates Proposition 1 when a given value of L is considered.
The assumption pa > pd holds above the upward-sloping 45 degrees line.
To interpret Proposition 1, begin by looking at the key assumption,
pa > pd. This makes the employer obtain a higher expected payo¤ by hir-
ing advantaged students, given the same school strategy for every student.
However this may not happen if the school gives extra teaching to a lower
proportion of disadvantaged than advantaged and low-ability students, since
this would increase the expected quality of the disadvantaged and high-grade
students.
12
When both pd and pa are higher than L= ( + L) (high-employment
equilibrium), the school maximises the amount of hired students by provid-
ing every student with extra teaching, since the employer thinks that a high
grade student very likely has high ability, irrespective of her social back-
ground. In the other two cases, the school maximises the amount of hired
disadvantaged students by giving less extra teaching to low-ability and dis-
advantaged compared to advantaged students.
In particular, when pa is higher and pd is lower than L= ( + L) (middle-
employment equilibrium), the employer still prefers advantaged rather than
disadvantaged and high-grade students. When both pd and pa are lower
than L= ( + L) (low-employment equilibrium), the employer is indi¤erent
between hiring an advantaged or a disadvantaged and high-grade student.
Proposition 1 shows that disadvantaged students are penalised compared
to advantaged students in each possible case: they may receive less teaching,
or be hired with lower probability to the employer, or both. In particular the
high and middle-employment equilibrium, where disadvantaged students are
penalised in the job market, exacerbate di¤erences in social class.
Note that the probability L can be interpreted as an inverse measure
of educational standard. The educational standard measures the level of
di¢ culty at school, how hard is to obtain a high grade11. Indeed as L
increases, obtaining a high grade becomes easierfor some students. Thus
the higher L, the lower the educational standard
12.
Thus, these results suggest some interesting considerations about grade
ination. This is depicted where the educational standard is low (L high),
11The literature on educational standards examines the criteria adopted by schools in
evaluating students. The theoretical frameworks on educational standards are provided by
Costrell (1994, 1997) and Betts (1998). In the context of educational standards, the issue
of social background has been introduced by Himmler and Schwager (2007), who show
that a school with a large proportion of disadvantaged students applies less demanding
standards since its students have less incentives to graduate.
12The educational standard can be employed as a tool for welfare analysis. A normative
extension of our set-up can be considered for future work.
13
since more low-ability students obtain a high grade. We can easily observe
that when L is high we are very likely to be in the low-employment equi-
librium, where the employer is indi¤erent between hiring advantaged or dis-
advantaged and high-grade students. Indeed the presence of grade ination
diminishes the employers expectations about students ability. Since the
school devotes less teaching e¤ort to disadvantaged rather than advantaged
and low-ability students, the grade ination e¤ect is stronger for advantaged
students, leading to the low-employment equilibrium. Therefore grade ina-
tion may have some positive e¤ect by helping disadvantaged students to have
the same job opportunities as advantaged students. This is in contrast with
other results on grade ination (Schwager, 2008), where the job opportuni-
ties of high-ability and disadvantaged students are penalised by the grade
ination of low-ability and advantaged students.
Finally, this result can be linked to the analysis of e¢ cient provision of
education. De Fraja (2005) shows that, in the presence of di¤erences in
social background, the optimal provision of education requires that disad-
vantaged and high-ability students receive more education than high-ability
and advantaged students. According to Proposition 1, a school caring about
the employment of its students does not devote more teaching e¤ort to dis-
advantaged rather than advantaged and high-ability students. Therefore a
policy intervention would be necessary to reach an e¢ cient level of education.
3.2 One social background
In this section we assume no di¤erences in social background. This allow us
to highlight the role of other characteristics, such as the educational standard
L and the distribution of ability, and the school and employer technology.
We consider a population of disadvantaged students13, i.e.,  = 0. In-
deed, a population of only advantaged student ( = 1) would make the high
13Note that, if  = 0 the middle or the low-employment equilibrium are equivalent for
a disadvantaged student.
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andmiddle-employent equilibria be indeterminate. The following proposition
shows which equilibrium takes place according to the value of pd.
Proposition 2 Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and  = 0. The high-employment
equilibrium occurs if pd  L= ( + L); the middle/low-employment equilib-
rium occurs if pd < L= ( + L).
Proof. See Appendix.
Figure 2. No di¤erences in social background
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The equilibrium which occurs depends on pd and L. If the educational
standard is high (L low) and pd is high, the equilibrium is high-employment.
If L is high and pd is low, the middle/low-employment equilibrium occurs.
If both are high or low, which equilibrium occurs depends on which e¤ect
prevails.
The upward-sloping line represents the points where pd = L= ( + L).
As the prot  increases, the employer hires more students and the threshold
shifts down. As the educational standard decreases (L high), the amount of
low-ability and high-grade students increases. Therefore the employer hires
less students and the threshold shifts up.
Finally, some considerations are necessary about the school strategy. Note
that in the high-employment equilibrium, the school gives extra-teaching to
all students even though some of them will not be hired. This happens
because of Assumption 2, which ensures a very high school benet from a
students employment. The cost of teaching a student who will not be hired
is much smaller than the benet loss incurred from a non-hired student who
did not receive extra teaching.
3.3 Analysis of equilibria
In this section we study the properties of our equilibria. The following corol-
lary shows some comparative statics results.
Corollary 1 A decrease in the educational standard (an increase in L) di-
minishes the employment opportunities and the provision of extra teaching;
an increase in the employers prot  increases the provision of extra teach-
ing; an increase in the proportion of advantaged students  increases the
employment opportunities for disadvantaged students.
Proof. See Appendix.
An increase in L makes the number of high-grade students increase.
Thus their probability of being hired diminishes. In turn this makes the
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probability of receiving extra teaching diminish. An increase in  leads to
more employment opportunities, hence the school gives extra teaching to
more low-ability students.
An increase in  has two contrasting e¤ects in a high-employment equilib-
rium: the amount of disadvantaged and high-grade students diminishes and
the employment opportunities for disadvantaged students are lowered. With
the rst e¤ect, the probability of a disadvantaged and high-grade student
being hired increases, while it diminishes with the second one. Nevertheless,
the rst e¤ect more than o¤sets the second e¤ect. The reason is the following:
a decrease in the amount of disadvantaged and high-grade students increases
job capacity relative to disadvantaged students (= (1  ) (pd + L (1  pd)))
with more intensity than it diminishes the relative employment placements
( (pa+L (1  pa))= (1  ) (pd + L (1  pd))). Therefore a higher propor-
tion of advantaged students may increase the job opportunities of disadvan-
taged students.
4 Subsidising disadvantaged students
In many countries, governments spend substantial resources to ght unequal
educational outcomes14. We can analyse such an intervention by considering
a government that cannot observe the students ability and subsidises the
school of an amount s 2 (0; 1] of its extra-teaching cost c for all disadvantaged
students. We examine the problem from a partial equilibrium perspective, in
the sense that government taxation is not integrated into education subsidies.
14To cite some example, in 2001 the Department for Education in the USA funded No
Child Left Behind (NCLB). This is a multi-billion dollar policy initiative to study the
determinants of test score gaps among students of schooling age and prevent adverse e¤ects
in adulthood for those left behind at school. It helps to address such policy issues as low
employment and wage proles over time as well as health problems that lagging behind
at school may lead to in adulthood. Since 2003 the Department for Education in the UK
has funded Every child matterswhich is a similar policy initiative to NCLB but it puts
additional emphasis on well-being and fostering positive behaviour in children.
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The following proposition shows the policy results.
Proposition 3 Assume that the government funds cs for every disadvan-
taged student receiving extra-teaching:
(i) if pa  pd  L= ( + L), the high-employment equilibrium occurs (as
before);
(ii) if pa  L= ( + L) > pd, the school strategy is
xHa = xHd = xLa = 1; xLd =
pd
(1  pd)

L
2 (0; 1) ;
while the employer strategy is
zUa = 1; zUd = min

c(1  s)
L
;
  (pa + L (1  pa))
(1  ) (pd (1 + ))

2 (0; 1) ; zDa = zDd = 0:
(iii) if pd < pa < L= ( + L), the school strategy is
xHa = xHd = 1; xLa =
pa
(1  pa)

L
2 (0; 1) ; xLd = pd
(1  pd)

L
2 (0; 1) ;
while the employer strategy is
zUa = min

c
L
;

(pa + (1  s) (1  ) pd) (1 + )

;
; zUd = min
(
c(1  s)
L
;
  c
L
pa (1 + )
(1  ) pd) (1 + )
)
; zDa = zDd = 0:
Proof. See Appendix.
In case (i) (pa  L= ( + L) and pd  L= ( + L)), the policy does not
have any e¤ect whatsoever, since the school would have given extra teaching
to every student even if no policy was applied.
In cases (ii) and (iii), as s increases, the probability that a disadvantaged
student is hired decreases. In the case (iii) also, the disadvantaged and high-
grade student does not have hiring opportunities as good as an advantaged
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student, like in the case pd < pa < L= ( + L) without subsidy. Finally,
when s = 1 (full subsidising), the school gives extra teaching to all disadvan-
taged students and the employer never hires a disadvantaged student.
Thus the policy might worsen her hiring opportunities. The reason is
intuitive. The lower the school extra-teaching cost for a disadvantaged stu-
dent, the lower the credibility of a high grade as a signal of high ability if
pd is low. Providing only high-ability students with extra teaching is not
a credible strategy, as ex post the school would give it even to low-ability
students.
No policy conclusion should be drawn from it. However this analysis
suggests care should be taken in policy choices, since the attempt to improve
the schooling attainment of disadvantaged students might in fact diminish
their job opportunities.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper examines how social background a¤ects schools teaching and an
employers recruitment. We analysed the interaction between a school and an
employer when students attend school and then apply for a job. Our results
suggest that disadvantaged students are penalised compared to advantaged
students, as they receive less teaching and/or are less likely to be hired.
The policy considerations can be extended in many directions. The gov-
ernment might impose some restriction on the employer strategy in order
to favour disadvantaged students, like in the case of a¢ rmative action. For
instance, the employer might be forced to hire a certain number of disad-
vantaged students. In welfare analysis a policy can be considered where the
educational standard (L) is set to maximize welfare.
Furthermore, the framework can be developed in several ways, two of
which we discuss briey. First, it seems natural to consider di¤erent schools
for each social group by taking into account di¤erences in quality of teaching.
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Second, it would be interesting to examine this framework alongside di¤er-
ent generations for explaining segregation or inequality. The analysis of an
extended model regarding these expansions is left for future work.
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Appendix
List of symbols
 H : high ability.
 L: low ability.
 a: advantaged social background.
 d: disadvantaged social background.
 pa 2 [0; 1]: probability that an advantaged student has high-ability.
 pd 2 [0; 1]: probability that a disadvantaged student has high-ability.
  2 [0; 1): proportion of advantaged students.
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 H 2 [0; 1]: probability that a high-ability student not receiving extra
teaching will obtain a high grade.
 L 2 [0; 1]: probability that a low-ability student receiving extra teach-
ing will obtain a high grade.
  2 [0; 1]: job capacity.
 gU : high grade.
 gD: low grade.
 : employers payo¤ for hiring a high-ability student.
 : schools benet when a student is hired.
 c: schools cost when a student receives extra teaching.
 H(H): number of hired students with high ability.
 H(L): number of hired students with low ability.
 ET : number of students receiving extra teaching.
 xLa; xHa; xLd; xHd 2 [0; 1]: probabilities that the school gives extra
teaching to an advantaged and low or high-ability student and to a
disadvantaged and low or high-ability student, respectively.
 zUa; zDa; zUd; zDd 2 [0; 1]: probabilities that the employer hires an ad-
vantaged student with a high or low grade and a disadvantaged student
with a high or low grade, respectively.
  (z j gj; pi; xzi): employers belief about a students ability.
 i 2 fa; dg: social background.
 z 2 fH;Lg: ability level.
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 j 2 fU;Dg: possible grade.
 s 2 [0; 1]: government subsidy of school extra-teaching costs for a dis-
advantaged student.
 Eji: employers expected payo¤ of hiring a student.
 Nji : employers expected payo¤ of not hiring a student.
 Tzi: school expected payo¤ of giving extra teaching to a student.
 NTzi : school expected payo¤ of not giving extra teaching to a student.
Proof of Proposition 1 and 2
The proof follows Proposition 1. By setting  = 0 we obtain the proof of
Proposition 2.
Case 1. pa  pd  L= ( + L)
Employer. The employer strategy is
zUa = 1; zDa = 0; zUd =
  (pa + L (1  pa))
(1  ) (pd + L (1  pd))
; zDd = 0:
The employers beliefs for advantaged students are
 (H j gU ; a) = pa
pa + L (1  pa)
and
 (L j gU ; a) = L (1  pa)
pa + L (1  pa)
;
if the student has a high grade and  (H j gD; a) = 0 and  (L j gD; a) = 1
if the student has a low grade. Thus the expected prot15 for hiring an
15The superscript of the employers expected prot indicates the action performed by
the employer, where E indicates to hire and N to not. The subscript species the
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advantaged and high-grade student is
EUa =
pa
pa + L (1  pa)
   L (1  pa)
pa + L (1  pa)
:
This must be
pa
pa + L (1  pa)
    (1  pa)
pa + L (1  pa)
 0;
and, after few passages, pa  L= ( + L). The expected prots for hiring
and not hiring an advantaged and low-grade student are EDa =  1 and
NDa = 0, respectively, thus 
E
Da < 
N
Da.
The employers beliefs for disadvantaged students are
 (H j gU ; d) = pd
pd + L (1  pd)
and
 (L j gU ; d) = L (1  pd)
pd + L (1  pd)
;
if the student has a high grade and  (H j gD; d) = 0 and  (L j gD; d) = 1 if
the student has a low grade. The expected prot for hiring one disadvantaged
and high-grade student is
EUd =
pd
pd + L (1  pd)
   L (1  pd)
pd + L (1  pd)
:
This must be
pa
pa + L (1  pa)
   L (1  pa)
pa + L (1  pa)
 0;
and, after few passages, pd  L= ( + L). The expected prots for hiring
and not hiring a disadvantaged and low-grade student are EDd =  1 and
students grade, where U and D stands for high and low grade, respectively, while a and
d indicates the students social background.
25
NDd = 0, respectively, thus 
E
Dd < 
N
Dd.
Then the employer needs to compare the expected prot obtained by
high grade students with di¤erent social background16: this is EUa > 
E
Ud,
as pa > pd. As a consequence,the employer admits all the advantaged and
high-grade students and the disadvantaged ones only for the remainder of
job capacity. Given the restrictions on job capacity, the number of hired
disadvantaged and high grade students is
  (pa + L (1  pa))
(1  ) (pd + L (1  pd))
:
School. The school strategy is xLa = 1;xHa = 1; xLd = 1;xHd = 1. The
expected payo¤s17 for giving or not giving extra teaching to an advantaged
and high-ability student are THa =   c and NTHa = H , respectively. This
must be THa > 
NT
Ha , that is    c  H , and therefore   c= (1  H).
The expected payo¤s for giving or not giving extra teaching to an advantaged
and low-ability student are TLa = L   c and NTHa = 0, respectively. This
must be TLa  NTLa , that is L   c  0, and therefore   cL .
The expected payo¤s for giving or not giving extra teaching to a disad-
vantaged and high-ability student are THd = zUd   c and NTHd = HzUd,
respectively. This must be THd  NTHd , that is zUd c  zUdH , and there-
fore   c= (zUd (1  H)). The expected payo¤s for giving or not giving extra
teaching to a disadvantaged and low-ability student are TLd = LzUd   c
and NTHd = 0, respectively. This must be 
T
Ld  NTLd , that is LzUd c  0,
and therefore   c=zUd.
16This is not necessary for low-grade students as none of them are admitted.
17The superscript of the schools expected payo¤ indicates the action performed by the
school, where T and NT stands for to give and not to give extra-teaching. The
subscript species the students ability, where H stands for high ability and L low ability,
while a and d indicates the students social background.
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Job capacity. The total number of hired students is:
(pa+L (1  pa))+(1  ) (pd + L (1  pd))
  (pa + L (1  pa))
(1  ) (pd + L (1  pd))
 :
Case 2. pa  L= ( + L) > pd
As pa  L= ( + L), the employer and school strategy for advantaged stu-
dents does not change compared to the previous case.
Employer. The employer strategy is
zUa = 1; zDa = 0; zUd = min

c
L
;
  (pa + L (1  pa))
(1  ) (pd (1 + ))

; zDd = 0:
The employers beliefs for disadvantaged students are
 (H j gU ; d) = pd
pd + LxLd (1  pd)
and
 (L j gU ; d) = LxLd (1  pd)
pd + LxLd (1  pd)
;
if the student has a high grade and  (H j gD; d) = 0 and  (L j gD; d) =
1 if the student has a low grade. Thus the expected prot for hiring an
advantaged and high-grade student is
EUd =
pd
pd + LxLd (1  pd)
   LxLd (1  pd)
pd + LxLd (1  pd)
:
This must be
pd
pd + LxLd (1  pd)
   LxLd (1  pd)
pd + LxLd (1  pd)
= 0;
and, after few passages, xLd = pd= (1  pd) L. To be a probability, then
pd= (1  pd) L < 1, by which pd < L= ( + L). The expected prots for
hiring and not hiring a disadvantaged and low-grade student are EDd =  1
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and NDd = 0, respectively, thus 
E
Dd < 
N
Dd.
Then the employer needs to compare the expected prot obtained by
high grade students with di¤erent social background: this is EUa > 
E
Ud, as
EUa > 0, while 
E
Ud = 0.
School. The school strategy is xLa = 1; xHa = 1; xLd = pd= (1  pd) L;
xHd = 1. The expected payo¤s for giving or not giving extra teaching to
a disadvantaged and high-ability student are THd = zUd   c and NTHd =
HzUd, respectively. This must be 
T
Hd  NTHd , that is zUd   c  HzUd,
and therefore   c=zUd (1  H). The expected payo¤s for giving or not
giving extra teaching to a disadvantaged and low-ability student are TLd =
zUdL   c and NTHd = 0, respectively. This must be TLd = NTLd , that is
zUdL   c = 0, and therefore zUd = c=L.
Job capacity. The total number of hired students18 is:
(pa + L (1  pa)) + (1  ) (pd (1 + ))
c
L
 ;
thus job capacity implies
zUd = min

c
L
;
  (pa + L (1  pa))
(1  ) (pd (1 + ))

:
Case 3. pd < pa < L= ( + L)
As pd < L= ( + L), the employer and school strategy for disadvantaged
students does not change compared to the previous case.
Employer. The employer strategy is
zUa; zUd = min

c
L
;

(pa + (1  ) pd) (1 + )

; zDa = 0; zDd = 0:
18Note that the number of disadvantaged and high-grade students in this equilibrium
is (1  ) (pd +  (1  pd)xLd) where xLd = pd= (1  pd) L. By substituting we obtain
(1  ) (pd +  (1  pd) pd= (1  pd) L), which can be simplied in (1  ) (pd (1 + )).
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The employers beliefs for advantaged students are
 (H j gU ; a) = pa
pa + LxLa (1  pa)
and
 (L j gU ; a) = LxLa (1  pa)
pa + LxLa (1  pa)
;
if the student has a high grade and  (H j gD; a) = 0 and  (L j gD; a) =
1 if the student has a low grade. Thus the expected prot for hiring an
advantaged and high-grade student is
EUa =
pa
pa + LxLa (1  pa)
   LxLa (1  pa)
pa + LxLa (1  pa)
:
This must be
pa
pa + LxLa (1  pa)
   LxLa (1  pa)
pa + LxLa (1  pa)
= 0;
and, after few passages, xLa = pa= (1  pa) L. To be a probability, it is
necessary that pa= (1  pa) L < 1, by which pa < L= ( + L). The ex-
pected prots for hiring and not hiring an advantaged and low-grade student
are EDa =  1 and NDa = 0, respectively, thus EDa < NDa.
Then the employer needs to compare the expected prot obtained by high
grade students with di¤erent social background: this is EUa = 
E
Ud, as both
EUa = 0 and 
E
Ud = 0.
School. The school strategy is xLa = pa= (1  pa) L; xHa = 1; xLd =
pd= (1  pd) L; xHd = 1. The expected payo¤s for giving or not giving extra
teaching to an advantaged and high-ability student are THa = zUa   c and
NTHa = HzUa, respectively. This must be 
T
Ha  NTHa , that is zUa   c 
HzUa, and therefore   c= (zUa (1  )). The expected payo¤s for giving
or not giving extra teaching to a disadvantaged and low-ability student are
TLa = zUaL   c and NTHd = 0, respectively. This must be TLa = NTLa ,
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that is zUaL   c = 0, and therefore zUa = c=L.
Job capacity. The total number of hired students19 is:
c
L
(1 + ) (pa + (1  ) pd)  ;
thus job capacity implies
zUd = min

c
L
;

(pa + (1  ) pd) (1 + )

: 
Proof of corollary 1
High-employment equilibrium. Di¤erentiation of
  (pa + L (1  pa))
(1  ) (pd + L (1  pd))
with respect to L, and  yields
@
@L
  (pa + L (1  pa))
(1  ) (pd + L (1  pd))
=

  1
1  pa
pd + L (1  pd)
+
(1  pd) (   (pa + L (1  pa)))
(  1) (pd   L (pd   1))2
< 0;
and
@
@
  (pa + L (1  pa))
(1  ) (pd + L (1  pd))
=
  (pa + L (1  pa))
(  1)2 (pd + L (1  pd))
> 0;
respectively.
Middle-employment equilibrium. Di¤erentiation of c=L with re-
19Note that the number of advantaged and high-grade students in this equilib-
rium is  (pa +  (1  pa)xLa) where xLa = pa(1 pa)  . By substituting we obtain


pa +  (1  pa) pa(1 pa) 

, which can be simplied in  (pa (1 + )).
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spect to L yields
@
@L
c
L
=   c
2L
< 0:
Di¤erentiation of pd= (1  pd) L with respect to L and  yields
@
@L
pd
(1  pd)

L
=
pd
2L (pd   1)
< 0;
and
@
@
pd
(1  pd)

L
=
1
L
pd
1  pd > 0;
respectively.
Low-employment equilibrium. Di¤erentiation of pd= (1  pd) L with
respect to L and  yields
@
@L
pa
(1  pa)

L
=

2L
pa
pa   1 < 0;
and
@
@
pa
(1  pa)

L
=
1
L
pa
1  pa > 0;
respectively.
Proof of Proposition 3
For each disadvantaged student, the government subsidises cs. This does not
changes anything in Case 1, as the school strategy was xLd = 1;xHd = 1.
Case 2. pa  L= ( + L) > pd
For advantaged students we refer to Proof: Case 2 of Proposition 2.
Employer. The employer strategy is
zUa = 1; zDa = 0; zUd = min

c(1  s)
L
;
  (pa + L (1  pa))
(1  ) (pd (1 + ))

; zDd = 0:
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The employers beliefs for disadvantaged students are
 (H j gU ; d) = pd
pd + LxLd (1  pd)
and
 (L j gU ; d) = LxLd (1  pd)
pd + LxLd (1  pd)
;
if the student has a high grade and  (H j gD; d) = 0 and  (L j gD; d) =
1 if the student has a low grade. Thus the expected prot for hiring an
advantaged and high-grade student is
EUd =
pd
pd + LxLd (1  pd)
   LxLd (1  pd)
pd + LxLd (1  pd)
:
This must be
pd
pd + LxLd (1  pd)
   LxLd (1  pd)
pd + LxLd (1  pd)
= 0;
and, after few passages, xLd = pd= (1  pd) L. To be a probability, then
pd= (1  pd) L < 1, by which pd < L= ( + L). The expected prots for
hiring and not hiring a disadvantaged and low-grade student are EDd =  1
and NDd = 0, respectively, thus 
E
Dd < 
N
Dd.
Then the employer needs to compare the expected prot obtained by
high grade students with di¤erent social background: this is EUa > 
E
Ud, as
EUa > 0, while 
E
Ud = 0.
School. The school strategy is xLa = xHa = 1; xLd = pd= (1  pd) L;
xHd = 1. The expected payo¤s for giving or not giving extra teaching to
a disadvantaged and high-ability student are THd = zUd   c(1   s) and
NTHd = HzUd, respectively. This must be 
T
Hd  NTHd , that is zUd  
c(1   s)  HzUd, and therefore   c(1   s)=zUd (1  H). The expected
payo¤s for giving or not giving extra teaching to a disadvantaged and low-
ability student are TLd = zUdL   c(1   s) and NTHd = 0, respectively.
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This must be TLd = 
NT
Ld , that is zUdL   c(1   s) = 0, and therefore
zUd = c(1  s)=L.
Job capacity. The total number of hired students20 is:
(pa + L (1  pa)) + (1  ) (pd (1 + ))
c(1  s)
L
 ;
thus job capacity implies
zUd = min

c(1  s)
L
;
  (pa + L (1  pa))
(1  ) (pd (1 + ))

:
Case 3. pd < pa < L= ( + L)
For advantaged students we refer to the proof (case 3) of Proposition 2.
As pd < L= ( + L), the employer and school strategy for disadvantaged
students does not change compared to the previous case.
Job capacity. The total number of hired students is:
c
L
(pa + (1  s) (1  ) pd) (1 + )  ;
thus job capacity implies
zUa = min

c
L
;

(pa + (1  s) (1  ) pd) (1 + )

;
and
zUd = min

c(1  s)
L
;
  pa (1 + ) c=L
(1  ) pd) (1 + )

:
20Note that the number of disadvantaged and high-grade students in this equilibrium
is (1  ) (pd +  (1  pd)xLd) where xLd = pd= (1  pd) L, by substituting we obtain
(1  ) (pd +  (1  pd) pd= (1  pd) L), which can be simplied in (1  ) (pd (1 + )).
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